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THE CONTINUING SAGA OF INTERNET CENSORSHIP: THE
CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT
Martha McCarthy*
The values behind the First Amendment make the costs that accompany
free expression worth bearing, but where children are concerned, the
benefits are not as strong and the costs are greater. 1

Since 1996, Congress has enacted several measures designed to
protect children from exposure to harmful materials over the Internet
and to punish those who send such materials or allow children to access
them. Legal conflicts over these laws have pitted First Amendment rights
to express views and receive information against governmental
obligations to ensure the well being of minors. The tension between these
important interests has generated volatile legislative debates and
numerous court cases, including several Supreme Court decisions. 2 This
article explores the competing values at stake and various legislative and
judicial efforts to balance them. Particular attention is given to the 2004
Supreme Court decision regarding the Child Online Protection Act 3 and
to issues that remain unresolved since this ruling.
I. FEDERAL LEGISLATION

Since the 1990s, Congress has exhibited concern about minors being
exposed to harmful materials via the Internet, given the ease of
communication through cyberspace. In 2000, there were approximately

*Chancellor's Professor, Indiana University
1. Kevin Saunders, Do Children Have the Same First Amendment Rights as Adults? The Need
for a Two (or More) Tiered First Amendment to Provide for the Protection of Children, 79 Chi.- Kent L.
Rev. 257,270 (2004).

2. These controversies pit liberal and communitarian philosophies against each other. For a
discussion of this topic, see Amitai Etzioni, Do Children Have the Same First Amendment Rights as
Adults?: Response, 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 299, 305-06 (2004).
3. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004) [hereinafter Ashcroft II] (interpreting 47 U.S.C. §
231 (2004)).
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600 million Internet users across more than 150 countries. Indeed,
Internet sites are doubling annually and include an estimated 100,000
pornographic sites; new strategies are regularly devised to redirect users
from legitimate sites to pornographic ones and to make it difficult to exit
once "kidnapped." 5
One commentator has observed four primary ways by which
children view inappropriate materials on the Internet. First, "commercial
actors" may send materials to children through cyberspace. 6 Second,
"child predators either send visual materials or talk with children in ways
considered harmful." 7 Third, minors intentionally locate illicit sites. 8
And fourth, minors find such sites accidentally. 9 Congress has therefore
attempted several times to curb the ease with which children come into
contact with obscene material online.

A. Communications Decency Act
The first law to generate a Supreme Court decision was the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), enacted as part of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which criminalized the knowing
transmission of obscene or indecent messages or images through
telecommunications to recipients under the age of eighteen. 10 The CD A
was not confined to commercial speech or entities; instead it covered all
postings on individual computers.ll The law stipulated that community
standards would be used to judge whether materials were indecent. It
imposed criminal liability on creators as well as transmitters of such
materials, so schools, libraries, and other institutions that allowed
children electronic access to such harmful materials were subject to
liability. 12
4. Susan Kosse, Try, Try Again: Will Congress Ever Get It Right! A Summary of Internet
Pornography Laws Protecting Children and Possible Solutions, 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 721, (2004).
5. See Rebecca L. Covell, Problems with Government Regulation of the Internet: Adjusting the
Court's Level of First Amendment Scrutiny, 42 Ariz. L. Rev. 777, 777-78 (2000); Kellv Rodden, The
Children's Internet Protection Act in Public Schools: The Government Stepping on Pa~ents' Toes? 71

Fordham L. Rev. 2141,2145 (2003).
6. Todd A. Nist, Student Author, Firzding the Right Approach: A Constitutional Alternative
for Shielding Kids from Harmful Materials Online, 65 Ohio St. L. ). 451,485 (2004).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9.

I d. at 486.

10. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (LEXIS 2004 & Supp. 1996) (In 2003 the act was amended; the former
description of content that "depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs," was changed to "is
obscene or child pornography.") Id. § 223(d)(l)(B).
11.

12.

Id. § 223(a).
Id.
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In 1997, the Supreme Court struck down two CDA provisiOns as
abridging the First Amendment. 13 The Court reasoned that the law's
vague provisions pertaining to indecent transmissions and patently
offensive displays chilled free speech and criminalized some legitimate
speech for adults. 14 Applying a strict scrutiny standard, the Court further
held that the measures were not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest because less restrictive means to shield minors
from access to inappropriate materials were available. 15 Given that the
Court struck down these CDA provisions, Congress has enacted other
measures to shield children from harmful Internet transmissions .
•q.

Children's Internet Protection Act

In contrast to the CDA, the Children's Internet Protection Act
(CIP A), signed into law in 2000, focuses on recipients rather than the
senders of transmissions. 16 It requires public libraries and school
districts receiving federal technology funds to enact Internet safety
policies for minors that include the use of filtering measures to protect
children from access to harmful images. 17 The law does not specify
particular filters that must be used, and it stipulates that the filters can be
turned off for adults to engage in research or other lawful activities. 18
Although the law specifies that local communities are to decide what
materials are inappropriate for minors, 19 a few major software companies
actually supply most filters nationally. 20
Upholding CIP A in 2003, the Supreme Court in United States v.
American Library Association recognized the latitude Congress has to
attach reasonable conditions to the receipt of federal funds, as long as the
conditions do not abridge constitutional rights. 21 This standard was met
13.

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).

14.

/d. at 845.

15.

Id. at 846.

16

47

u.s.c. § 254 (2004).

17. hi. § 254(h)(5)( B). CII' A applies to the E-rate Program, which provides discounts on
telecommunications and Internet access f(Jr eligible schools and libraries, and to the Library Services
and Technology Act that provides grants for eligible agencies to purchase computers or to pay for
the direct costs associated with Internet access. SeeN. Y. St. Library, Library Services and Technology
Act (LSTA) Program, http:/ /www.nysl.nysed.gov/libdev/lsta/lsta04/cipahkgd.htm (accessed March 2,
2005) or N. Y. St. Library, 10-Ratc (Universal Services .fin Telccormmmications Discounts Program),
http://www.nysl.nysed.gov/lihdcv/univsvc/llprogram (accessed March 2, 2005).

Id. § 254(h)(5)(D).
Id. § 254(f).
20. Sec john Berry, The Disarray o( Defeat: There Is a Small Victory .fin Free Access in Our
CIPA Setback, Library j. (Aug. 15, 20tH), at 8; Kosse, supra n. 4, at 739; Martha McCrrthy, Internet
Censorship: Values in Conflict, 183 Ed. Law Rep. 299, 307 (20(J4).
21. US. v. Am. Ub. Assn., 539G.S. 1'!4, 196 (2003).
JR.

19.

since libraries could already adopt filters on their own without
implicating the First Amendment. The Court rejected the contention that
the filtering software prevents adult library patrons from gaining access
to some constitutionally protected expression or abridges libraries' First
Amendment rights, given that the filters can be disabled for adult
patrons. 22
Declining to apply heightened judicial scrutiny in reviewing the law,
a majority of the justices concluded that since libraries can exclude
pornography from print collections without being subjected to
heightened scrutiny, they should similarly be able to block online
pornographyY The Court emphasized that a public library is not
creating a public forum when it acquires Internet terminals. 24 It is
providing such Internet access to facilitate learning for research and
recreational purposes and not to encourage free expression. 25 Although
this decision applied specifically to the library portions of CIP A, one
assumes that the rationale would be even stronger to uphold CIPA's
provisions requiring schools to adopt such protections as a condition of
receiving federal technology aid. 26
C. Child Online Protection Act
The Child Online Protection Act (COPA) has generated the most
litigation, including the 2004 Supreme Court decision that will be
addressed here in some detail. In enacting COPA in 1998, Congress
attempted to resolve some of CDA's constitutional defects by making
COPA narrower in scope. COPA prohibits content harmful to minors
(under seventeen) from being distributed for commercial purposes
through the TnternetY The commercial limitation is defined in the law
as those indivtduals "engaged in the business of making such
communications" in that the persons devote "time, attention, or labor to
such activities" as part of their trade or business. 2x Thus, individuals
placing materials on the web as a hobby would not be subject to COP A.
An additional limitation is that COPA targets online communication that
22.

Id. at 208-0'1.

2.'. Id. at 207 OS. l'our justices, however, indicated that at least heightened ,crutiny should
have hcen used, and two Df the four, Justices Souter and ( ;inshurg, argued for ,._,tricl scrutiny analy~is.
!d. at 21'1 (Breyer, I., c·ntKurring); ill. at 220 (Stcvem, )., dissenting); id . •tt 231 (Souter,)., joined k
(;imburg, j ., disscntlllg). J·or a discussion nf these stan<brds and a more detailed analysis of the AlA
case, sec :vic< :arthy, supra n. 20, at 299.
24.

,\Ill. Ub. Am1., 539 U.S. at 195.

25.

ld.

26.

Sec Me( :arthy, supra n. 20.

27. 47 C.S.C.
2~.

~ 23l(a)(l )(d)( I) (2004).

ld. § 231(cJ(2).

TI-lE CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT

83]

87

is publicly accessible over the Internet and does not target all methods of
online communication, such as e-mail. 29 COPA imposes criminal and
civil penalties on those who knowingly make available such materials in
interstate or foreign commerce. 30 The law includes affirmative defenses
for those who restrict access to prohibited materials by reasonable
measures such as requiring use of a credit card or adult identification
number or accepting a digital certificate that verifies age. 31
The law defines materials harmful to minors as "any
communication" (e.g. picture, image, recording, etc.) that "applying
contemporary community standards ... and with respect to minors is
designed to appeal to ... the prurient interest; depicts, in a manner
patently offensive with respect to minors, ... sexual acts or ... contact ...
; or taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value for minors." 32 This standard is adapted from one applied by the
Supreme Court in 1973 to determine whether materials are considered
obscene and thus outside the protective arm of the First Amendment. 33
II.

LITIGATION PERTAINING TO

COPA

Litigation challenging the constitutionality of COPA was initiated in
1999. 34 The district court granted a preliminary injunction, reasoning
that the law would place a burden on some protected expression. 35 The
court did not find evidence that COPA's criminal penalties for
distributors of the targeted materials constituted the least restrictive
means available to achieve the government's goal of restricting minors'
access to harmful communication via the Internet. 36 On appeal, the
2'1. lhe prohih11cd matcrialmllq be placed on the World \Vide Web "using hn,trtext transfer
protmol or,m: successor protocol." '!7 U.S.C. §231(c)(1).
311. 47 l 1.S.L. ~ 231. Amon[( other things, (( lPA imposes a $50,000 fine and six months in
prL...,nn fnr knowing u>mmcrcial posting of such <..~_,Jacnt. There also have been legislative efforts to
c urt,;il the .spread of child pornography via the Internet. Sec Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535
l.S. 231 (2002) (striking down the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, lH L:.S.C. § 2251

(2\100). that prohibited the distribution of virtual child pornography, finding no actual harm to
children bcc,lil'l' no "real" children were used). Sec Kosse, supra n. ·1, at 760~64 .
.11.

-17L:.s.c~211(c)(Ii

~

12

ld

.1.1.

S,-c· ,\Iiiier 1'. 1"11/if(nni<l, 413 l.S. 15, 2·1 (1'!73) (holding that the basic guidcline.s frn tnal

2.\1(e)(6) .

L<lltrh lo u:-.L' in idL·ntlf)·ing unprotcdcd obscene rnakrial arc: "(a) whether 'the a\Tl\lgt' ptT.son,

.lpph 111g contc·mpor;uy c"<>mmunity standarch' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the· prmient interest; whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive w.ry, .sexual
conduct 'i'c·cific.dly defined hy the applicable stale law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
L1Lk'> . . criou-., literary, arli:-.lic, political, or scientific Yaluc").

_11.

\,·,· ,\ Lf(l 1'. linw, 31 1'.

-"· Id. at l'J'i .
.16.

[,/.at ·1'!7.

~upp.

2d 473 (F. D. i'.L 19'19).

00

D.I.U.

LlJU~~

llVl'<

~l'<lJ L~
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Third Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
granting the preliminary injunction, recognizing that an injunction can
be issued only after considering the following factors:
(l) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success
on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably harmed by
denial of the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in
even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting
the preliminary relief will be in the public interest. 37

But the Third Circuit used a different rationale to justify the
injunction. The appeals court concluded that COP A's use of community
standards made the law unconstitutionally overbroad in that distributors
would have to gear messages to the most conservative community to
satisfy this requirement. 38
Reviewing the appeals court's ruling, the Supreme Court rendered its
first COPA decision in 2002. 39 The Court concluded that COP A's use of
community standards to identify harmful materials does not render the
law unconstitutionaliy overbroad. 40 But the Court remanded the case for
reconsideration of other grounds on which COPA could be found
unconstitutional. 41
Again enjoining the enforcement of COPA, the district court focused
on the argument that there were less restrictive ways to achieve the
government's goal-mainly using filtering devises-and that the
government did not prove that these alternative methods were not
effective. On remand, the Third Circuit once more affirmed the district
court's injunction on the enforcement of COPA. 42 The appeals court
used the strict scrutiny standard and concluded that the law likely
violated the First Amendment on two grounds. First, the court held that
COP A would probably not be considered narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest in that it is not the least restrictive
means to prevent minors from using the Internet to gain access to
harmful materials. 43 Second, the appeals court reasoned that COPA
would likely be found overbroad because it places significant burdens on
web publishers' dissemination of protected speech and on adults' access

37. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 172 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE,
Inc., 171 !'.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg/. Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d
1471, 1477 n. 2 (3d C:ir. 1996))).
38. 217 1'.3d at 166.
39.

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) [hereinafier Ashcroft I].

40.

Id. at 5H5.

41.

!d. at 602.

42.

ACI.U v. Ashcroji, 322 F.3d 240,251-66 (3d Cir. 2003).

43. I d. at 251-6G.
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to such speech. 44 The government then again appealed the Third
Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court.

A. Supreme Court Majority Opinion in Ashcroft II
Addressing COPA a second time in Ashcroft v. ACLU, the Supreme
Court in 2004 affirmed the Third Circuit's conclusion that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by entering the preliminary
injunction. 45 The Supreme Court reiterated that to grant such an
injunction, the trial court must conclude that the plaintiffs are likely to
prevail on the merits of their claim and held that the plaintiffs had
satisfied this standard. 46 However, the Supreme Court's five-to-four
decision was narrower than the Third Circuit's ruling. The majority
focused on the likelihood that the statute burdens "some speech that is
protected for adults." 47 The Court reasoned that it was important to let
the injunction stand pending a full trial because of the potential harm in
chilling protected speech that could result from prosecution of
distributors of Internet materials under COPA. 48 The Court concluded
that COPA likely violated the First Amendment because it imposes a
content-based restriction, noting that "the Constitution demands that
content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid." 49
While continuing the injunction and suggesting that filters would be
less restrictive of First Amendment freedoms than criminal sanctions to
achieve the legitimate governmental objective of protecting children, the
Court did not completely shut the door regarding the constitutionality of
COPA. The majority held that a remand was appropriate for additional
proceedings regarding the effectiveness and reliability of filtering
software. 50 In remanding the case, the Court indicated that it would be
possible, although not likely, for the government to meet its burden of
showing that COP A is necessary for Congress to accomplish its goal of
safeguarding children from harmful materials via the Internet. 5 1
The key question on remand will be "whether the challenged
regulation is the least restrictive means among available, effective
alternatives." 52 The central alternative considered by the district court

44. Id. at 266-71.
45. Ashcroft II, 124 S. Ct. at 2787.
46. Id. at 2791.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2787.
49. Id. at 2788.
50. Id. at 2787.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2791.

was blocking and filtering software, and the Supreme Court majority
noted that filters may be more effective than criminal penalties Cor
several reasons. First, filters "impose selective restrictions on speech at
the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source." 51 Second,
adults may gain access to constitutionally protected speech that might be
viewed as harmful to minors by turning off the filter on home computers
or requesting that filters be turned off on library computers.~ 1 In
addition, filters can be applied to e-mail as well as the World Wide
\Neb, 55 whereas COP A's sanctions do not extend overseas.' 6 In essence,
operators who would be threatened with criminal penalties in this
country could simply move pornographic operations overseas and avoid
criminal penalties under COPA. Also, the majority recognized that the
technological landscape had substantially changed since the district court
made its findings of fact five years earlier, so perhaps now filters are even
less apt to overblock or underblock sites. 57 Finally, requiring the use of
credit cards to access the material may not keep minors away as
envisioned, because some minors have such cards. 5 ~
Moreover, the Court rejected the argument that Congress is not
authorized to legislate filtering software, noting that "fillers are part of
t h e current regu Iatory status quo. "s· 9 It re f-erre d to t l1e S
, upremc c·"ourt 's
2003 decision upholding the Children's Internet Protection Act that
conditions certain federal aid on public libraries and ~chools adopting
filtering software.h 0 The Court majority also recognized that Congress
has the authority to enact laws that promote the use of filters by
parents. ()J
The Court applied strict scrutiny in deciding that the injunction
should remain in effect since this was a content-based speech restriction
akin to one that the Court had invalidated in United Stales v. Playboy
Entertainment Group. 62 In Playboy Entertainment Group, the adult
entertainment company challenged part of the Telecommunications Act

53.
5,4-_

Id. at 27'12.
Id.

55.

/d. at 2793.

56. The Court also cited the 1\cport of the Commission 011 Child Online l'rot,·dlon to Con,;n·s·;
indicating that filters are nHHt.' effective than age-verification requirements. Thus, the go\'t..T1lllh'llt\
own con1n1i~sion seems to refute the assertion that COPA 1s the lca:-.t restrictive alkrnati\'c . .4slicTo/f
11, 124 S. ( :t. at 2792-93.
5/.

I d. at 27H7.

5H. I d. at 27H6.
60.

!d. at 2793.
Sec Am. Lil>. Assn., 539 U.S. 19·1.

61.

Ashcroft 1/, 121 S. Ct. at 27'!3.

62.

''29 U.S.

5lJ.

~03

(2000).
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of 1996 (Section 505) that required cable companies to fully scramble
sexually-oriented programming or limit their transmissions to between
10 p.m. and 6 a.m. when children would not likely be watching.<;:; The
"full scrambling" requirement was designed to address signal bleed
(either audio or visual portions of the scrambled programs might be
heard or seen). 64 The Court ruled that these requirements abridged the
first Amendment because of the effective less restrictive alternative of
households ordering signal blocking. Such targeted blocking allows the
government to support parental authority without denying adult
speakers and willing listeners their First Amendment Rights. 65 The
Ashcroft II majority felt that the similar content-based aspect of COPA
implicated the first Amendment and therefore merited strict scrutiny.
The Court in Ashcroft II was not persuaded that COP A's application
to only commercial communication reduced the law's constitutional
defects. 66 In addition, the majority recognized that the legal landscape
had changed since the case was initiated because two other federal laws
had been enacted in the interim, perhaps reducing the need for COPA.
Congress passed a prohibition on adopting misleading Internet domain
names to prevent web site owners from disguising pornographic sites. 67
Also, it enacted a law creating a second-level Internet domain, "kids.us,"
which has content that is restricted to appropriate material for minors
under age thirteen. 6H The justification for COPA's criminal sanctions
may not be as great as when the law was passed in 1998.

B. Ashcroft II Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsberg, concurred with the Court
majority that other methods, such as filtering software, would serve
congressional interests in protecting minors from sexually explicit
materials as well as or better than COP A's content-based restraint on the
dissemination of constitutionally protected speech. 69 He further argued
that criminal sanctions were inappropriate because the line is not clear
between offensive and protected communications, and he voiced
uneasiness with using criminal regulation as "a substitute for, or a simple

63.

/d. al H06.

/d.
!d. al i\07.
66. See intra n. 13H and accompanying text.

64.

65.

67.

I H U.S.C.A. § 2252B (West Supp. 2004).

Saunders, 3upra n. I, at 25H; see also Llot Kids Implementation and E/!iciemy Act o/2002,
47 U.S.(.~ 'HI (2004).
6H.

60.

Ashcrofi II, 124 S. Ct. at 2796 (Stevens, ).,joined by (;insburg, )., concurring).
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backup to, adult oversight of children's viewing habits." 70
However, Stevens strongly disagreed with the Court's conclusion that
the contemporary community standards could be used to assess whether
materials are harmful to minors. 71 He claimed that this would allow the
least tolerant communities in America to determine what would be "a
crime to post on the World Wide Web." 72
Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor, dissented in Ashcroft II, arguing that COPA is constitutional
because it is narrowly drawn to further a compelling interest and is the
least restrictive means available to further that interest? 3 In short, Breyer
contended that COPA satisfies the strict scrutiny standard? 4 He
concluded that the only significant difference between COP A's definition
of obscene images and the definition of unprotected, obscene material for
adults that was articulated in Miller v. California consists of the addition
of the phrase "with respect to minors." 75 He claimed that "material that
appeals to the 'prurient interests' of some ... adolescents" surely would
"appeal to the 'prurient interests' of some ... adults as well" and would
not be protected under Miller? 6 Thus, he found nothing in COPA that
broadens prohibitions beyond what is already considered unprotected
obscene material. 77 In fact, Breyer asserted that by restricting C0PA's
limitation of penalties to commercial pornography the statute's
application is further confined, which reduces the First Amendment
infringement. 78 He conceded that the identification requirements for
adults have some costs and may deter potential users from viewing
certain materials for fear of embarrassment? 9 Still, he noted that this
does not differ from the use of filters, required by CIP A, which adults
must ask to be disabled_Ro
Justice Breyer also contended that available filtering software simply
does not solve the problem of protecting children from inappropriate
materials because it lets some harmful material through, and it costs
money that not all families can afford. 81 He additionally observed that
70. !d. at 2797.
72.

Id. at 2796. Sec supra n. 34 and accompanying text.
Id.

73.

/d. at 2797 (Breyer,)., joined by Rchnquist, C.)., and O'Connor,)., dissenting).

71.

74. Id. at

2797~98.

75.

/d. at

2798~'!9.

76.

/d. at 2799.

77.

I d. at 2800.
2799~2800.

78.

/d. at

79.

Id. at 2801.

80. Jd.
81. Id. at 2802.

83]
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children are not always under parental supervision, and filters depend on
parents' willingness to enforce use of the software. 82 Furthermore,
Breyer noted that filters overblock some useful and protected materials.s'
Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Breyer's conclusion that COPA is
constitutional, but he wrote separately to argue that COPA should not be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. 84 He contended that the commercial
pornography covered by COPA enjoys less constitutional protection and,
therefore, does not raise a First Amendment concern. 85 With the
Supreme Court justices thus divided on the issue, the future of Internet
censorship seems uncertain.
Ill. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
The U.S. Constitution was not drafted with children in mind, so the
application of constitutional provisions to children has always been
troublesome. Protecting freedom of expression often collides with
safeguarding children's welfare, and the guiding principles to resolve this
conflict are not always clear. Legislation designed to restrict access to the
Internet focuses on children primarily as consumers of expression rather
than as creators and distributors. 86 Often polar positions are offered as
to whether children should be treated like adult citizens in terms of
access to Internet sites or whether adults should be treated similarly to
children in that materials deemed harmful to minors should be restricted
for everyone. These positions raise sensitive questions, pitting important
values against each other. When materials are restricted for children, is
the spillover that burdens adult access to lawful materials too heavy a
First Amendment price to pay to protect children? Or is a slight
restriction on adult access worth the gain in protecting children from

82.

!d.

83.

!d. at 2S02 -03.

84.

!d. at 2797 (Scalia,

H5.

!d. at 2797.

J., diS>enting).

H6. A parallel body of law is emerging where students themselves arc the ones placing
materials on the World Wide Web. and sometimes these strands of litigation overlap. In general,
be!(m: students can be disciplined by school personnel t(Jr Intcrnl'l postings, courts have required
evidence that students' personal web sites or other transmissions created at home are libelom, cause
a school disruption, or in other ways interfere with the management of the school. See e.g, Iluessink
v. Woodland R-1\-' Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (l·:.n. Mo. 1998) (granting a preliminary injunction
against suspending a student for posting a homepagc that criticized the school); Killion \'. Frm1klin
Reg/. Sch. Dist., 136 f'. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (finding that a student's suspension ti1r
publishing a list with some derogatory statements about the school athletic director violated the l'irst
Amendment because the expression did nol create a substantial disruption); Emmett v. Kcllt Sch.
Dist. No. 415, <J2 F. Supp. 2d 10RH (W.D. Wa. 2000) (overturning the suspension of a student t<11·
creating and posting mock "obituaries," since the website did not actually threaten anyone).

v. L. u.

LLJ U~rt 11Vl.._ 1"\l.._lJ

Lf\ VV ) U U Kl\11\L

lLlJU:J

access to harmful pornography and graphic violence? Strong, even
compelling, arguments can be mounted on both sides.
The American Civil Liberties Union tends to argue that any
restrictions on access to Internet materials, which might chill expression
among adults, should be struck down under the First Amendment. 87
Advocates of this position contend that protected expression does not
change depending on the recipient of the material. 88 They claim that
restricting access to protect children has too substantial an impact on
adults' protected expression. 89
In contrast, those supporting government restrictions that make it
difficult for anyone to have access to materials considered pornographic
or otherwise harmful for minors contend that the protection of children
trumps the First Amendment rights of adults to send and receive
information. 90 Some conservative citizen groups claim that protecting
the community from harmful influences is more important than Free
Speech concerns, because obscene and other detrimental materials
corrupt our society. 91
Possibly, there is a middle ground between these opposite assertions.
A more moderate position is that the tension between the two core values
of encouraging free expression and protecting children can be resolved
by balancing the interests rather than by having one trump or negate the
other. 92 This stance acknowledges that children can suffer harm from
Internet transmissions, while at the same time it recognizes the
importance of adults' free expression rights. 93 But determining how
these interests should be balanced is a monumental task.
A. Voluntary Censorship

Some who feel that the balance should be struck in favor of the free
exchange of ideas contend that government intervention is not needed to
protect children because it should be assumed that adults will voluntarily
protect minors from exposure to pornographic, excessively violent, or
other detrimental materials. 94 They argue that parents should ensure
:-17. Hr. of Appellees, ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1'196), http://www.epic.org/
frce __ spccch/CDA/bwsuit/sup_ct_brief.html (accessed March 2, 2005).
88.

Id.

89. Id.
90.

Sec Ashcrofi II, 124 S. Ct. al2798-99 (Breyer,)., dissenting).

91. Sec Amitai Etzioni, Do Children Have the Same First Amendment Rights as Adults?: On
Protecting Children From Speech, 79 C:hi.-Kcnt L. Rev. 3 (2004).
92. !d. at4.
93. !d.
94. Sec Separate Statement of Commissioner c;Ioria Tristani, Federal Communications
Commission, Commission Finds Industry Video Programming Rating System Acceptable: Adopts
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that their children will not have access to such harmful content by taking
full advantage of the availability of V -chips 95 and filters to block these
materials, and of labeling and rating systems for music, television
96
programs, and movies.
Movies have been rated since the 1960s, but
ratings of television programs are more recent. The Telecommunications
Act of 1996 specified guidelines for rating television programs and
established requirements that new television monitors meeting certain
size specifications must include V -chip technology. 97 The law gave the
television industry a year to enact a voluntary ratings system, which it
did. After some revisions, the TV Parental Guidelines were accepted by
the Federal Communications Commission in 1998. 98 Strides have been
made
in
providing voluntary
options
to
censor various
telecommunications transmissions, even though additional attention to
publicizing these strategies is needed to ensure public awareness.
Much of the attention directed to alternatives to criminal sanctions
for harmful Internet transmissions has focused on the use of software
filters that can be installed in a host server and used with a network of
computers or can be installed on individual computers (as required for
public libraries and schools to receive federal technology funds under
CTPA). The software is designed to block sites that have been identified
as containing the categories of material to be restricted-in this instance,
material that is harmful to minors. Even if filters are considered the least
restrictive means to protect children, problems will persist. The criteria
used by software companies in deciding which sites to block often are not
transparent, so their congruence with legal standards is difficult to
ascertain.l)'J Overblocking as well as underblocking are still concerns, and
questions remain about the ability of filters to block pornographic

'/ ccllnic<ll nc<[Uircmcnts to L:nu/Jlc Hlocking of Video Programming (the "V-Cilip), !'( :c :\e'" (l'vlarch
12, l 0%), http:/ /flp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cablc/:--l~ws _Releases/1998/nrcbR003.html (accessed March l 9,
21l1Li);

Saunders, supra
95.

11.

l,

<It

27_"\, 276.

A\' -chip is a feature designed to enable viewers to block the display of all programs with

specified rating~.

%. Sec gcucm/lv, Committee to Study Tools and Strategies fN Protecting Kids from
l'mnography, 1\:ational J(e"'"rch Council, Yout/1, Pornography, and the Intcmct (Dick Thornburgh
& I krbert Lin ecb., Nat'\ Academics 2002), http://www.nap.edu/html/youth_internct/ (accessed
\larch 2, 200~).

Y7. -17 L;.s.c. § 303(x) (2tlll4); see also 47 U.S. C.§ 330 (201l4)

'Jl:l.

Sec Separate Statement of Commissioner Gloria Tristani, supm n. 94. However, the ACLU
"a' nut sati,fied with the ratings system, contending that these "voluntar:·" measur~s were actually
g.tJ\'crnmcntally coerced.
'!9. Sec !'au\ Smith, Frec-Spccc/1 Groups to Filtering Co111panics: Co///c Cimn, J.SUJOOI. :\1.1\''
(Aug. 2003 ), at H.

u.Lu .

.c.uu~..d"l.l1Vl'll\l'IU
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pictures that are not accompanied by text. 100 Some new software is
designed to monitor the content being retrieved rather than to block
particular sites, which helps with the overblocking and underblocking
concerns. 101 As noted previously, ideally each community would devise
criteria for restricting particular sites or content, but in reality software
developers are usually making these important decisions. 102
Some commentators have suggested that the problem with minors'
access to harmful materials in cyberspace could be addressed by Internet
zoning. Todd Nist has proposed that children can be protected by
creating a separate x-rated Internet domain (e.g..xxx) that could be
accessed only with software purchased with verification of age. 103 This
approach places the burden on those attempting to gain access to the xrated zone rather than on the developers or distributors of the
materials. 104 Using this strategy, specific material would not be removed;
instead, certain content would be placed in "a secluded location, off in
the back, where children cannot go." 105 However, given that minors
might get the necessary software from relatives or others, verifying that
only individuals of a certain age have access is not as easy as checking
minors' age before serving them liquor in a restaurant. 106
Rather than zoning the Internet itself, Amitai Etzioni has suggested
that a solution might be to have separate computers for children and
adults. 107 He has noted that there is some precedent in that libraries
often have separate children's sections and video rental stores have Xrated sections. 108 But this strategy would not address access to harmful
materials on home computers, where voluntary censorship by adults
would still be required. 109
B. Treating Children and Adults Differently

Even those asserting that parents should monitor their children's

100. See Saunders, supra n. 1, at 259.
101. See supra, n. 96.
102. See Kosse, supra n. 4, at 739. Where schools are required to adopt filters as a condition of
receiving federal technology aid and they delegate blocking decisions to software companies,
questions arise regarding whether schools are delegating their legal authority to determine the school
curriculum to software companies in violation of state constitutional provisions. See McCarthy,
supra n. 20, at 307-09.
103. Nist, supra n. 6, at 481-85.
104. See id. at 481.
105. Id. at 490.
I 06. !d. at 482.
107. Etzioni, supra n. 91, at 28-29.
108. Id. at 29.
109. See id.
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access to harmful materials concede that some parents are not aware of
the filters and related technology available to them and that other parents
are simply not inclined to censor their children's Internet access.U 0 The
question remains: should the government treat children differently in
terms of legislative protections because they comprise a vulnerable
group?
Champions of governmental intervention note the historical
evidence supporting the differential treatment of children and adults for
First Amendment purposes. For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts the
Supreme Court found that the government's interests in protecting
children overrode parents' interests in having their children engage in
selling religious materials and preaching on public roads. 111
Subsequently, in Ginsberg v. New York, the Supreme Court recognized
the governmental responsibility to protect children when it upheld a New
York law prohibiting the sale of materials deemed to be pornographic to
minors under age seventeen. 112 In this case, the Court recognized the
legislative authority to assist parents in ensuring the welfare of children,
noting that "the concept of obscenity ... may vary according to the group
to whom the questionable material is directed." 113
Similarly, the Court has upheld the Federal Communications
Commission ruling that disallows the broadcast of indecent speech when
children are likely to be listening or watching unsupervised.U 4 Also, to
settle ongoing litigation, major tobacco companies agreed to terms of a
settlement that included restrictions on advertisements that appeal to
children, such as the use of cartoon characters or sponsoring events or
team sports that have a substantial youth audience. 115 Of course, such
advertising is commercial speech, which is entitled to less First
Amendment protection than other forms of expression. 116
There is a fairly large body of law documenting that children in
schools are treated differently from adults in applying constitutional
protections. In the landmark case recognizing that students have
expression rights in public schools, Tinker v. Des Moines, the Supreme

110. Seeid.at31-33.
111. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
112. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 {1968).
113. Id. at 636 (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. 1966)). More
recently, the Fourth Circuit upheld state prohibitions on the display of sexually explicit materials to
juveniles under eighteen. Amer. Booksellers Assn. v. Va., 882 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 u.s. 1056 (1990).
114. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
115. National Association of Attorneys General, Tobacco Settlement Agreement at a Glance,
http:/ /www.naag.org/issues/tobacco/msa (Nov. 6, 1998) (accessed january 15, 2005).
116. See e.g. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,64-75 {1983).
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Court nonetheless acknowledged that the school is a special environment
in terms of First Amendment rights. 117 In subsequent cases the Court
has recognized that students' expression rights in public schools are not
coextensive with those of adults in other settings. 11 H For example, the
Court held in 1986 that lewd and vulgar student expression is not
protected, even though adults might enjoy First Amendment protection
for such expression. 119 The Court further held that it is appropriate for
school personnel to determine what expression is lewd and vulgar and
thus subject to censorship. 120
Assuming for the moment that some government intervention is
needed to protect children and that free expression rights apply
differently to children and adults, 121 who should decide what is harmful
for minors, how should this determination be made, and how differently
should children be treated from adults? If community standards are used
to determine what materials are harmful, then the category of prohibited
. ls may vary great Iy across commumtles
. . an d states. 127- Sorne h ave
matena
argued that using community standards is unworkable, particularly
involving the Internet, because of the global reach of the transmissions to
.
. . an d countnes.
. 121·
very d 1verse
commumtles
However, Justice O'Connor has countered these assertions by noting
that a national standard is being promoted in terms of values, and this
standard has been articulated and can be legislated. 124 Justice Breyer
similarly has argued that "community" refers to the nation's adult
community taken as a whole rather than to geographic areas. 125
Agreeing, Etzioni has further observed that
the very Constitution and its First Amendment that liberals rise to
defend reflect national values that some communities may well not
endorse if left to their own devices, but we hardly exempt those
communities from abiding by it. Of course, Congress is an institution
authorized to speak for nationwide preferences and values. So is the

117. 393

u.s. 503,506-07 (196'!).

II~.

Sec generally Hazelwood Sch. District ..
U.S. 675 (I 9Ho).
120.

Bethel, -178 U.S. at 6R2-H3.
Sec id. at 685.

121.

Sec Etzioni, supra n.

119.

484

U.S. 260 (I<JSS); !lethe/ Sch. /)ist.

1'.

Fr<1scr. ·l7K

91, at ·12.

122. See id. at 50-52.
123. Sec e.g. Kelly !vl. Doherty, Student Author, ;\n Analysis of Ohscl'llitv and ind,·n·luT
Regulation on the Internet, 32 Akron L. Rev. 259 (I <)99); Philip E. Lewis, Student Author, ;\ Hrid
Comment on the i\pplic<ltion of the "Contc111porary C:om111unity Standard" to the lntan.·t, 22
Campbell 1.. Rev. 143 ( 1999).

124.

Ashcroft I, 535 l;.s. at

125.

!d. at 5R'J-91 (Breyer,)., concurring).

587-R9 (O'Connor,)., concurring).
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While some assume that the use of community standards might
result in applying restrictive norms of the most conservative geographic
community to the nation as a whole, the counterargument is that a
virtual national standard would likely adopt the perspective of the most
liberal communities. Nist argues that the intent of a national standard is
not to force one group's values on everyone else; it is to protect
expression. Thus, "a national standard stops the government from
restraining expression that the more liberal communities deem to be
okay; it stops the government from restraining unpopular expression." 127
Even if consensus is reached regarding which community standards
are applied, determining the contours of expression that are harmful to
children remains extremely problematic. Using a modified Miller 12 R
standard to identify obscene materials does not address how depictions
of violence would be screened. Indeed, there is more evidence of the
harmful effects on children of violence than of pornographic materials. A
group of major professional associations addressing concerns of youth
documented more than 1,000 studies pointing to a causal relationship
between media violence and children's aggression. 129 Some research has
shown a greater impact of the violence in video games than of television
violence, because of the active and interactive nature of the games. 130 Yet,
most of the efforts to block Internet transmissions accessible to minors
have focused on obscenity rather than violence. 131
Another area of uncertainty pertains to the status of hate speech and
harassing expression, which can be quite harmful to children. Legislative
efforts to restrict minors' access to the Internet have not usually
addressed such expression unless combined with obscenity. 132
Resistance Records and other groups are currently promoting hate
speech and music to young people via the Internet, 133 and whether such

126. l'tzioni, supra n. 91, at 52.
127.

Nist, supra n.

o, at 472-73.

12R. Miller, 413lJ.S. 15. See supra nn. 32-33 and accompanying text.
129. Am. Acad. ol Pediatrics et al., joint Statement of the Impact of Entcrtaimnent
\'iobzce 011 Children (July 26, 2000), http://www.aap.org/advocacy/releases/jstmtevc.htm (cKCcssed
March 2, 2005); but sec Marjorie Heins, On Protecting Children - From Censorship: A Reply to
Anzitai I.'tzioni, 7lJ Chi.-Kcnt I.. Rev. 229 (2004) (providing a contrary position on the impact of
media violence).
130. Sec Craig Anderson and Karen Dill, Video Games and Aggressive Thoughts, Feelings, and
lichavior in the Laboratory and in Life, 7R Personality & Soc. Psycho!. 772, 7SR (2000).
13!. Sec Saunders, supra n. 1, at 262.
132. Sec J;Cnmzlly 47 U.S. C.~ 231; 47 U.S. C.~ 223.
133. Anti-Defamation League, Deafening Hate: The Revival of Resistance Records,
http://www.adl.org/rcsistanccrecords/summary.asp (2000) (accessed March 2, 2004).

sites would be blocked with current filters is ambiguous.
If agreed that children deserve special governmental protection,
questions still remain regarding whether all minors should be treated in
the same manner. The term "minor" as used by Congress in COPA refers
"in a literal sense to an infant, a five-year old, or a person just shy of age
seventeen." 134 But the government in defending COPA has argued that
"minors" are older adolescents who may be capable of possessing a
prurient interest. 135 The key consideration is whether there should be
categories of minors, with greater protections for younger children. Very
young children can easily surf the Internet and inadvertently be exposed
to harmful materials with a few wrong clicks. Some advocate an agedifferentiated approach with children twelve and under receiving greater
protection than teenagers between ages thirteen and seventeen. 131i An
age and content-based system would shield younger children from
certain materials and would protect older minors (teenagers) from access
to other types of Internet speech. tr
·1
Questions also remain regarding how differently to treat commercial
expression. Traditionally, commercial expression has enjoyed some
constitutional protection, but not the same level as afforded speech
intended to convey a particular point of view. 13 s The drafters of COPA
attempted to address the CDA's defects by restricting COPA sanctions to
commercial purposes, but this restriction did not satisfy the courts that
COPA should pass constitutional scrutinyY 9 In fact, the Third Circuit
concluded that this limitation did not narrow the reach of COPA
sufficiently because the law's provisions went beyond commercial
pornographers to any communication for commercial purposes even if
distributors do not make a profit from such material. 1 10 Whether
commercial restrictions could be drafted to satisfy the First Amendment
is still not clear.

l.l.f.

,\(."[.[.', 322 F.3d at 256.

135

!d. at 253.

See Ftnoni, supra n. <Jl, at-12-•17.
Sec id. at •13--17; sec also Dawn Nunziato, flo Children Have the Same First Amendment
/l.ig!Jts As Adult.1 7: ·rowanl '' Constitutional /l.cgulatio11 of Minors' Access to Harm/ill i11temet Speech,
79 Chi. Kent I.. Rn. 121,121-22 (200·!).
13Cl.

137.

131\. Sec e.g Rd. of Fmste,•s v. Fox, .J<J2 U.S. 469 ( 19K<J) (finding that government restrictiom on
commercial speech do not have to be thr least restricti\·e mean-"> to achieve the dc.-,ircd govcrnrncnt
goal; thL'IT simply needs to be a reasonable fit between the restrictions and the goal); Holgcr, 463 U.S.
at M--75 (holding that commercial speech in lcrms or unsolicited mailings is ati(n·ded lc"
constitutional protection than other l(mns of expression).

139.

Sec generally Ashcroft II, 124 S. Ct. 27?13 (2004).

I 10.

ACUJ, 322 F.3d at 256.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. ACLU dealt another blow to
congressional efforts to shield minors from exposure to harmful
materials over the Internet. 141 But the issues left unresolved are not
going away, given the mind-boggling growth of cyberspace, which shows
no signs of dissipating. Increased education is crucial to alert parents and
others about dangers on the Internet and to encourage all involved to be
mindful of Internet safety. Also, governmental efforts to regulate the
Internet, especially access by children, seem destined to continue
generating legal controversies and moral dilemmas. Some governmental
protection of children in cyberspace seems necessary, but how much
protection is allowed by the First Amendment remains elusive.

141. See generally Ashcroji II, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (20(l4).

